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Introduction
When, in 832, the scribe Rodoaldus sat down to write up the dispute between the bishop of Piacenza and the descendants of Hermefrit, he seemed to have a template ready to hand. The bishop claimed that Hermefrit’s descendants owed labour service for their land, but did not want to perform it. There being a matter in dispute, Rodoaldus therefore followed the standard model of a dispute charter, a notitia iudicati, along adversarial lines: he quoted each party laying out their case in turn, in direct speech. Having done so, however, he abruptly switched models. The parties had reached a ‘friendly agreement’ (amica pactuicio), and he wrote the rest of the charter according to the template for a written agreement, a cartula convenientia.​[1]​ The impression, then, is that although the bishop of Piacenza initially pursued his claim through the formal judicial process, his ‘opponents’ – tenants of the bishopric – quickly proved willing to settle ‘out of court’.
Documents like this serve to undermine the intuitive image of an early medieval Europe in which often violent conflict was endemic, even normal.​[2]​ It is an easy characterization, encouraged by sources that tend to foreground strife and discord, and that have influenced a historiography that accommodates conflict more easily than peace: ‘simply because [medieval] society was so contentious, order, community and consensus become the problem, not the explanation’.​[3]​ In Rodoaldus’s document, however, where the parties were a bishop and his peasant tenants, the potential for class conflict quickly gives way to social peace; where we might expect to hear discord, we in fact get harmony. The case therefore bears witness to an increasing trend in the documentation of intra-social conflicts (or ‘conflicts’) in early medieval Italy, towards narratives of acquiescence, if not agreement, rather than dispute. It stands in marked contrast to northern Europe, especially west Francia, where the increasing willingness of scribes to set down elaborate, less formulaic, descriptions of conflicts has directly fed a debate among historians over a perceived rise in conflict and concomitant weakening, or ‘privatization’ of mechanisms of conflict regulation: the ‘feudal anarchy’ of classic historiography.​[4]​ Over precisely the same period, from the ninth to the twelfth centuries, Italian court-case documents of the notitia iudicati type become more formulaic, frequently adopting limited forms of words which attested not argument, but agreement: instant, unchallenged, and decisive. This essay examines the history of that development, and draws out some of its implications. In particular, in noting the unhelpfulness of court-case charters, it will consider the evidence for early medieval Italian conflicts in other types of document, and what they can tell us about the way in which conflicts were managed in this period.
Discouraged by the absence of real conflict in notitiae iudicati, one could, of course, turn instead to narrative sources, which often relate with relish the clashes of aristocrats, churchmen, and rulers, both within the judicial court and outside it. These give plenty of material for studies of attitudes to conflict and the kinds of processes through which they were managed. Empirically, though, there is always the problem of their authors’ very disparate literary agenda.​[5]​ However plausible the story of a conflict’s progress and resolution, it was related for reasons other than to give insight into its progress and resolution.​[6]​
Seeking evidence of conflicts that reveals genuine social norms and disputing strategies, historians have not unnaturally tended to look to legal documents, which have been thought to offer objective reflections of the societies that produced them. Taken as a single genre, the legal document is a complex category of evidence. All literate societies produce texts that can be seen as contracts, including formulae that encapsulate accepted norms, whether for arranging a marriage, undertaking a piece of work, or transferring some land. It is documents in this latter category, dealing with transfers of property, that constitute the vast majority of those that survive, in many thousands, from early medieval western Europe. Very largely this is because they related to, where they did not actually prove, the ownership of particular pieces of landed property, and so might retain some utility for successive owners of that property. Some of them are extant in their original form, at first written on a variety of media but increasingly on single sheets of parchment (and known as charters), others are preserved as copies made later (often centuries later), either on single sheets or collected into books (cartularies).​[7]​
The insights that individual charters offer into their societies are very limited. But when they survive in collections from discrete places and periods, they can reveal general patterns of activity, property, and social condition in that place and time.​[8]​ Even in these cases, however, there are significant filters between the charters and the realities from which they sprang. The most obvious and widely acknowledged of these is that the vast majority of the documents that survive to us from early medieval western Europe do so because they were preserved by ecclesiastical institutions. What we can see is not just what was preserved, but what churchmen preserved. It is not a safe assumption that those churchmen’s archival strategies were always especially careful or systematic or consistent, nor that every preserved document directly concerned the institution that preserved it: many of our documents do not mention churches or monasteries at all, let alone the institution in which they ended up, but embody the ordinary legal business of laymen and women.​[9]​ In general, however, the majority of the surviving documents comprise those of particular use to the institutions that kept them, especially by providing a record of their property transactions, whether as proof against future claims or as the building blocks of institutional memory (or, most often, both).​[10]​ While these are reasons for, rather than strategies of, archiving, they gave ample incentive for shaping the record, both by selecting what to keep and what to lose (or destroy), and, in a number of demonstrable cases, by creating a new record of a past event – in a word, forging.​[11]​ This brings us to a further filter between the charter and the real event: the charter scribe, his assumptions, his training and, in particular, his models. The requirement that charters be formulaic, so that they could be recognized as valid, not only constrained their scribes’ ability to describe the actions and transactions before them; it sometimes meant that the description distorted the action to fit a preconceived legal paradigm. Thus, for instance, historians are increasingly noticing that some of the transactions in Italian charters that take the form of a sale were actually describing loans of money, in which the transferred land was collateral.​[12]​ In some circumstances, then, the writers of charters could cast events differently to suit their own polemical purposes – which raises the familiar problem of how we can understand the reality behind the text. Are charters to be included among those texts from which, as one suggestion has it, we can recapture only ‘epiphenomena of textuality’, that reveal something of the ideological and textual influences of their scribes, and of the authorities that sponsored the documents, but little of the social realities?​[13]​
The formulaic nature of charters certainly constitutes another filter between such texts and their contexts. In many parts of early medieval Europe, the use of documents in Latin to communicate and to sanction the rights of the socially empowered followed a continuous tradition from late antiquity, so that most of the formulae that made them up originated in the late Roman legal environment. Their critical study began in the second half of the seventeenth century, partly because claims to property by some age-old institutions, especially ecclesiastical ones, continued even then to be based on medieval documents. The need to show anew that these documents were valid – in the face of the more sceptical attitude of the early modern period – gave rise to the discipline of diplomatics: the identification and analysis of a document’s formal characteristics, including textual elements – formulae – that help to indicate a document’s period and place of production, and so to sift genuine text from later interpolation or outright forgery. Latterly the task of diplomatics has expanded to cover not only the extraction of factual information from documents but also their analysis in order to gain insights into ideologies, cultural traits, and social attitudes. It has nevertheless tended to retain a long-established basic distinction between what are generally called ‘public’ acta – documents drawn up according to established forms by institutional authorities to bestow rights of one kind or another (for instance, to grant land, or office) – and private documents, whether more formal (private acta), or less so (brevia, notitiae), which dealt with a wider range of legal business, including notes about different stages of contracts, transactions, and disputes.​[14]​

Dispute Documents and Social Change
Searching for documents about disputes, historians have understandably turned first to those generated by law courts which, since courts are generally thought of as public entities, have tended to be classified as ‘public acts’. Thus, the most formal and initially widespread records of court proceedings – subjective, because written in the voice of the judges, and kept as proof of the judgement by the winning party – have traditionally been distinguished as a sub-set of the ‘public’ class of documents, generally known by the Latin terms of art they have been given by diplomaticists of placitum or notitia iudicati.​[15]​ This kind of document has provided the grist for sustained consideration of early medieval disputes. With an acknowledged debt to the anthropology of dispute, late twentieth-century historians have seen many of them as attesting practical solutions to conflict, aired in public before the peer group who would ultimately be responsible for their enactment, and aimed at managing, rather than entirely eradicating, social tensions.​[16]​ They have observed some important fundamental features of these documents: their limited reference to written law codes, the prevalent use of writing as a means of both proof and record and the preponderance of landed property as the focus of the dispute records that survive.
It is worth underlining, however, that the law court was not the only forum in which disputes were played out. Plaintiffs could choose to use courts or not, but other forms of settlement were always available. To limit ourselves just to property disputes in Italy, we can note remissions of fines,​[17]​ lease-backs of property,​[18]​ the offer of alternative pieces of property,​[19]​ the discontinuance of a suit,​[20]​ or, in general, the kind of ‘friendly agreement’ (amica pactuacio) that may have lain behind the Piacenza case with which we started.​[21]​ Evaluating the relative merits of judicial and extra-judicial dispute mechanisms has been one of the most important aspects of recent work, especially since the effectiveness of courts has been taken as an indication of the effectiveness of the state, itself a concept of debateable value for the early medieval West. Some have therefore emphasized the preferability of courts’ adjudication over extra-judicial compromise – ‘what was attractive about the [formal process of the law court] was its ability to produce a decision’.​[22]​ Even in the era of robust Carolingian government, though, the two need not be seen as distinct alternatives.​[23]​ Warren Brown has shown how the Bavarian aristocracy of the Carolingian period adopted disputing strategies that gave different weight to formal and informal mechanisms depending on political circumstance.​[24]​ State structures were only one option for directly managing disputes, and the historian’s task becomes one of trying to discern under what conditions disputants chose that structure or mechanism over another. When we come to the societies of the tenth and eleventh centuries that are sometimes labelled ‘stateless’, the barrier between adjudication and compromise seems entirely to have dissolved. Patrick Geary has argued that in societies in which public courts were weak or wholly lacking, what we would generally label ‘judicial’ and ‘extra-judicial’ mechanisms existed symbiotically, and disputing was all the more explicitly a matter not of resolving conflict, but of managing it.​[25]​
The balancing of attention between texts that were written up at a court and those produced outside the formal judicial process has become central to a debate over actual social change. For fifty years the paradigmatic account of shifts in social relations in the post-Carolingian centuries (the ninth to the twelfth) was Georges Duby’s study of the Mâconnais, based on the documents preserved in the archives of the cathedral of Mâcon and the abbey of Cluny.​[26]​ Duby noticed a distinct change, in the period around 1030, in the form of these documents, from tightly-structured texts using time-honoured formulae (which he termed ‘charters’) to freer compositions with greater narrative content (‘notices’), and he paid particular attention to documents emanating from and/or recording judicial proceedings, which he categorized according to the involvement of comital authority. The surviving documentation of dispute in the Mâconnais increasingly through the late tenth and early eleventh centuries becomes that of the numerous but relatively ineffectual castellans’ courts, of arbitrations, and of extra-judicial agreements, while the count’s court itself seems to shrink in remit and the range of personnel it involved.​[27]​ These trends, Duby thought, faithfully reflect an actual change in the administration of justice, when ‘public’ powers exercised by the count through his court and through lesser aristocrats in his name, passed definitively to the latter, becoming their ‘private’ rights.
The notion of abrupt social change around the year 1000 rests on a documentary typology that has been significantly undermined in recent years.​[28]​ To distinguish as ‘public’ those court documents that record the presence of the count, and as ‘private’ those with no discernible comital involvement, has proved difficult in the numbers of cases even among the Mâconnais documents where, for instance, the court presidents were men regularly associated with the count or ecclesiastical dignitaries who presided sometimes alongside the count, and sometimes on their own.​[29]​ Equally, the distinction between ‘dispositive’ and ‘probatory’ documents – between documents that effected and documents that recorded – does not allow for the possibility that we find realized in many documents of a degree of hybridization between these two functions: these are intrinsically complementary principles; and the notion of ‘dispositive’ in any case masks differing degrees of legal effectiveness.​[30]​ The balance of document types in our record does change in the late tenth and eleventh centuries, and may even include types that were genuine innovations, but older types did not disappear, even among survivals, and the changes are in part attributable to the increased number of those survivals, itself a product of monasteries’ improved archiving.​[31]​ These texts seem therefore to bear witness not to social transformation, but to the effects of ‘monastic reform’.​[32]​

Law Court Notices and ‘Undefended Cases’ in Early Medieval Italy
In current historiography, these observations are overwhelmingly based on material from, and therefore valid for, west Francia or France. How far they are useful for Italy depends especially on taking account of the very different nature there of the same genre of evidence, the surviving charters. These texts present historians of Italy with a problem that in one sense is the reverse of that at the heart of the ‘transformationist’ debate in France. For where the latter arose from the increasing emphasis on more verbose, less formulaic notices that become more prevalent in the record around 1000, in Italy an increasing number of the formal notitiae issued by courts were couched in legal and bureaucratic formulae that differ remarkably little from one document to another. As with all instances of standardization, therefore, the particular details of individual cases become harder to see. Yet historians searching for disputes and their underlying social tensions have tended to concentrate on these documents to the neglect of other types of source that might shed light on the whole process of a dispute. This is perhaps explicable simply by the exceptional number of such documents that Italy preserves: far more for the earlier centuries (from the eighth century to c.1000) than does Francia.​[33]​ Another contrast with Francia is that a majority of those who physically wrote the Italian documents were laymen, whose understanding of the Christian notion of justice was filtered through a bureaucratic training in civic institutions, in contrast to the monastic backgrounds of Frankish (and, later, French) charter scribes, which may have encouraged in them a more literary style, and certainly exposed them to a highly moralized view of justice.​[34]​
The moral aspect of justice found its way into Italian court case notitiae through the development in the ninth century of formulae that effectively emphasized social peace. Although she almost certainly did not have them in mind when she formulated the idea, ninth-century Italian notitiae increasingly bear witness to what Laura Nader called an ‘ideology of harmony’; an ideology that in this case developed in the West under Christian influence, and reinforced social control by the powerful.​[35]​ The necessary conservatism of diplomatic formulae means that identifiable signs of change are inevitably small and gradual. Nonetheless, the first notitia to move away from a strictly adversarial format dates from 814, a document issued by a judicial tribunal headed by the king’s envoy (missus) meeting in Spoleto, which is preserved in Farfa’s eleventh-century cartulary.​[36]​ Specifically, it is the first case in which the defending party denies, in its reported speech, that it wishes to dispute the material fact asserted by the opposing party. While taken on its own it seems simply to attest one party’s rather inept and self-contradictory attempt to plead their case, the recurrence of a similar form of words in subsequent notitiae suggests that in fact it marks the beginning of a change in the scribal template, perhaps unconnected with what was really being said in court. Developing a new form of words that strikingly distinguishes them from their north European and Catalan counterparts, scribes in central and northern Italy started to employ a rhetoric of harmony, stressing that the submitting party should ‘be at peace’ (quiescere),​[37]​ or, in another formula, ‘quiet and content’ (tacitus et contentus),​[38]​ and to include willing admissions of the apparent opponents’ case: ‘truly, we do not dispute with that party’.​[39]​ By the last quarter of the ninth century, whole templates had emerged that categorically obscured any real arguments that may have taken place in court, and replaced them with anodyne agreements and concessions.
The earliest such form to appear among the surviving documents is known as finis intentionis (finis intentionis terrae or finis intentionis status), which first appeared in the 870s.​[40]​ Here, the plaintiff made a statement of his rights in a thing (that is, rights – such as ownership – associated with a legally-recognized entity – such as a piece of property), declared himself ready to confront an opponent, and requested a formal recognition of his rights from a ‘defendant’. Generally, this latter party would then simply state that he had, or could make no claim to, rights in the thing. A related form was the ostensio cartae, first appearing in 880/1, in which a plaintiff presented a charter expressing his rights in a thing, other parties were asked if they wished to contradict it, and they declined to do so.​[41]​ The main difference from the finis intentionis was that the text of the charter was copied out in extenso in the notitia.​[42]​ The third procedure, appearing first in 874 (but not again then until 896), was the investitura salva querela, in which the plaintiff stated his rights in a property, no defendant appeared, and the court formally invested the plaintiff with possession, while leaving open the possibility that a defendant could press a claim to the property in the future, within a certain period.​[43]​ All three forms can be termed ‘undefended cases’. Their spread among our surviving documents is strikingly rapid: by 900 – within just over twenty years – they account for two out of every three surviving notitiae, and for four out of five by the later tenth century. By the later eleventh century, the ‘traditional’ form of the notitia, relating a true dispute (altercatio) between two parties, has virtually disappeared from the record.​[44]​
The speed with which these new forms were taken up by law courts’ scribes in the kingdom of Italy prompts questions about their origins. It suggests a controlling hand, and that hand has generally been located at the royal court in Pavia, where was based the cadre of professional judges that had evolved by the 870s from the royal notarii of the early ninth century.​[45]​ It is straightforward to see these men as the principal agents of change; but the reasons for change are less clear and have provoked a good deal of debate, not least because they concern how we interpret the formulae themselves.​[46]​ The issue is in fact a reflection of the debate about the social reality behind shifts in documentation in late tenth-century France, though paradoxically, because where the French notices become less standardized, ninth-century Italian ones become more so. In both cases the dilemma is to know how far scribes’ initiatives were driven by procedural considerations, and how far they were responding to shifts in political and social realities. Did they develop new forms because disputes were occurring differently, or because they wanted to write documents differently? The degree of standardization of these forms and their rapid spread seem to indicate central control from Pavia, which by the last quarter of the ninth century was the base of operations for the royal notary-judges who had become the key officials in the judicial system. Since the ‘undefended case’ formats follow those of earlier notitiae up to the end of the plaintiff’s statement, at which point their narratives jump immediately to the concession (professio) by the other party, some historians have seen them as arising from a simple desire on the part of these notaries to omit details of the hearing that were ultimately irrelevant, and to record only the court’s decision. They may have been prompted, it is suggested, by the growing dominance of charters as modes of proof: even in the more traditional notitia format, the display of a valid charter before the court was increasingly likely to end the case.​[47]​ Certainly, the ‘undefended’ formats show signs of having developed from the forms of words used to deal with particular types of procedural problem, such as contumacy.​[48]​ What we cannot tell is whether this was a development only in formulae, or whether the actual procedures followed in court developed along with them. The language of the ‘undefended case’ charters constitute a logical conclusion to the development in earlier notitiae of a rhetorical attitude that the court could and did achieve finality. Already in the Lombard era, the concluding statement of the body of the text (conclusio) tended to follow the simple formula ‘Et finita est causa’ – the case is closed, the dispute concluded.​[49]​ In the Carolingian period, many notitiae directly express the royal aspiration ‘to make and deliver justice to each man’.​[50]​ The intensification of this language from the 820s onwards suggests that notaries were starting to recognize a shift in the ideology underpinning their task. As the stated aim of courts became increasingly to ‘iustitia facere’ – to bring about the decisive stability, and therefore harmony, that Carolingian capitularies regularly extolled – their notitiae moved away from the task of describing how to manage disputes in a practical way.​[51]​ It encouraged them rather to prefer a form for their notitiae which formalized the adversarial process, and focused on a case’s ‘winner’.​[52]​
This interpretation can be taken further by looking a little more closely at examples of the ostensio cartae, in which the provisions of pre-existing documents received confirmation before the court. Where we can date these pre-existing documents, they are mostly very recent: they were being brought before a court very soon after their redaction. Since there was in these cases no time for a real dispute to arise, the court, or at least the notitia of ostensio cartae that it produced, seems to be functioning not as a forum for resolving a dispute, but rather as a final corroborative stage in the validation of a transaction.​[53]​ This in turn indicates that the language of ‘dispute’ in these documents is fictive. While there have been plausible arguments that some of these ‘undefended case’ notitiae were based on real disputes, historians have tended latterly to prefer to see these documents as the products of notaries exploring new possibilities for their traditional documentary forms.​[54]​ There is a recognition that looking for ‘real’ disputes here runs the risk of missing the true point of this evidence. Attesting the fact of a dispute’s existence is not really enough – there are always disputes. To gain any significance from that fact we need to know how the dispute progressed and what was its substance. But in the absence of any other evidence the dispute’s process is entirely lost to history if its only product is a document that does not spell that process out.​[55]​
The question, then, is how to treat texts that are too rigidly formulaic to be read as literal narratives of real events. We might begin with the notion that the court was a ‘public’ institution. Although some previous historiography has seen recourse to a court as an index of the strength of the state, it would be wrong prima facie to think of early medieval law courts as ‘public’ in the sense of being invariably intertwined with a state apparatus, any more than they were necessarily detached from particularist interests, or automatically objective towards matters in dispute. Nor is it helpful to think of the documents emanating from law courts as possessing a peculiarly ‘public’ character. Pleas that give the names of the presiding tribunal at a court, and notices that give the names of witnesses to matters in dispute, could each be used creatively in the actual process of disputing, in ways that eroded boundaries between private interest and any distinct ‘public sphere’. In a sense, it is the latter that dispute notitiae help us to define, though there is a danger of circularity: the notitiae are public because drawn up in the presence of those there named; but ‘the public’ are those named in notitiae. Nonetheless, it is certainly crucial to the intended meaning of notitiae – including, perhaps especially, those of ‘undefended case’ formats – that they were written before an audience.
There is an obvious sense in which dispute notitiae resemble scripts. They generally include forms of words that are supposed to have been spoken by the parties at court, the actors in the drama: formulae that training and tradition had conveyed to scribes, judges, disputants, and bystanders.​[56]​ To view notitiae as scripts also implies that the actions that they describe can be seen as rituals.​[57]​ Many of them conform to the definition of ritualized behaviour as repeated, standardized, and performative.​[58]​ This goes not only for deliberately ceremonial gestures, such as oath-swearing or the use of symbolic objects like the festuca or, in ninth-century Italy, the fustis.​[59]​ It is also true of more material actions like the seizure of land, the offering of pledges and the brandishing – and reading – of charters. Even the procedural activities of the parties in trooping off to court and offering claims and counter-claims were, on this definition, essentially ritualistic in that they were standardized performances. The law court was a theatre in which parties could air issues and grievances before their peers, and before those who were perhaps greater than them in social status and/or coercive power. It allowed legal norms to be rehearsed and, where they conflicted, reconciled. And although there were other, extra-judicial, stages on which to play out disputes, what distinguished the law court was the opportunity it offered to publicize issues before a particular audience, and in a context of ideological authority. Although texts as stylized as the Italian notitiae had become by the late ninth century are untrustworthy guides to real events, bearing out fully Philippe Buc’s complaint that literary narrativization of medieval rituals makes real actions inaccessible,​[60]​ they nonetheless constitute the best evidence for the court’s key function of publicizing business that would otherwise remain private: best, because they were themselves its written witness – literal ‘publications’. Transactions that would otherwise have been known only to the parties themselves, confined to documents that only they would see, became known to the tribunal and the often numerous crowd that attended the law court.​[61]​ The script may have been fiction, but the audience was real.
In ‘undefended case’ notitiae, those named among the tribunal and bystanders performed a crucial role in confirming the rights embodied in the documents presented to them. It was a role for which, by the ninth century, there was a pressing need. As I have suggested elsewhere, the traditional form of seeking public validation for property transactions through registering them in civic archives had probably ceased to exist; at the very least, it had become far less reliable than formerly.​[62]​ The later Roman empire had developed a widely-used mechanism by which written acts that had not been issued by a public authority could still attain a fair degree of legal security by being registered in municipal offices established to keep track of property ownership for the purpose of taxation, the gesta municipalia. Although these offices disappeared – gradually, erratically, but eventually – all over western Europe after the end of Roman government, the essential quality that registration in the gesta had bestowed on a document – its publicization, lending it greater formality – continued to be valued, and scribes even in the Carolingian period included in documents formulae for registration in the gesta municipalia long after there is any evidence for such an office in the relevant area.​[63]​ This creative way of overcoming an absence of legal security therefore seems to indicate a durable desire to lend weight to documents. Given this continued need, coupled with the profound institutional changes of the Carolingian period, it is plausible to think that the procedures of law courts, and especially the documents they produced, could have come to perform this function.​[64]​ While the ‘state’ and the ‘public’ were by no means synonymous, they did overlap in the law court, and there could lend force to legal acts.

Non-Judicial Documents about Disputes: the Sarnaglia Donation, 762
If the ‘undefended case’ form that came to predominate among those documents that were ostensibly about disputes was essentially a creation of the notaries’ bureaucratic mindset, it offers only very limited access to real disputing processes. For these, we need to turn to documents that relate to a dispute, but were not the end-product of a formal court hearing. A donation charter issued in Lombard northern Italy in 762, records within it the dispute that gave rise to the donation.​[65]​ It relates that a man named Audiris gave property to the church of S. Maria in Sarnaglia, the priest of which was Odo; that Audiris’s brother Gildiris ‘entered’ that property ‘contra racionem’; that as a consequence many hearings followed, culminating in one before the duke of Ceneda (modern Vittorio Veneto), Ursus. Ursus’s court ruled that Gildiris should pay composition for his action ‘qualiter in aedicti pagina nuscitur esse’ (‘as is known to be in the pages of the Edict’: i.e. written Lombard law). But Gildiris did not have the wherewithal to pay the composition, so had to hand over all his property to Odo, and confirmed this with a charter. It is not clear whether this included the land that Gildiris’s brother had given to the church. With the current charter, Odo transferred all the confiscated property back to Gildiris’s son, Troctovus. The charter included a stipulation that if Gildiris owed a payment from the property to a certain Ado or any other man, the charter about this was to be invalid. Finally, there is a fairly standard sanction clause, requiring a payment of double the property’s value if Gildiris or Troctovus (or any other) tried to revive the dispute, and a statement of the return gift or launegild that Troctovus had given to Odo: a shirt.​[66]​
This charter is particularly valuable because it relates the whole process of the dispute, rather than just the odd snapshots that most notitiae provide. There are a number of different actions, events, and outcomes. Seeing the process as a whole enables us to read it along the lines established by current historiography. It is very clear, for instance, that written documents were essential to the processing of the dispute, with new documents being produced at each stage. In addition to the surviving, final, donation charter, there was certainly a donation charter enacting Audiris’s initial gift to the church and one embodying Gildiris’s transfer of his property to Odo. There are likely also to have been notitiae setting down the proceedings at each of the hearings following Gildiris’s violation of the gift; brief records of the pledges that were made around each hearing for the attendance of disputants and witnesses and the enactment of the court’s judgement – examples survive from other parts of Italy;​[67]​ and a document setting out Gildiris’s debt to Ado. The narrative also allows us to follow the recommendation to evaluate the role of the court in relation to other procedures. In this case, that role was fairly limited: the earlier hearings (presumably at the court of the local sculdahis) had been entirely ineffectual, and the judgement of the ducal court was overridden by Odo’s ‘act of mercy’ in handing back all the confiscated property to the defeated defendant’s son. We would have been ignorant of this if all we had were the court-produced notitia, as in so many other cases. The extensive use of writing in both judicial and extra-judicial, formal and informal, procedures suggests in fact that no real distinction between the two existed in contemporary mentality, and that this document therefore bears out Patrick Geary’s point that disputes were managed through a symbiotic process, as well as depicting parties adopting the kinds of strategies that Warren Brown has revealed in Bavaria.​[68]​ While notitiae iudicati privilege the role of the court in managing disputes, documents of other types reveal that early medieval disputants had a pragmatic sense of the possibilities available to them, according no preference or superiority to institutions that we would associate with the state.
It is possible to see this mid-eighth century case as a stepping-stone towards the ‘undefended’ cases that emerge in notitiae a century later. Since neither party ultimately lost anything in relation to their original position, and Gildiris and Troctovus may have gained the land of Audiris, and certainly gained by having a troublesome debt annulled, there is a suspicion of fictitiousness about the roles of Gildiris as malefactor and Odo as wronged plaintiff. This document could therefore have been concocted in order to affirm property rights while relieving Gildiris and Troctovus of their obligation to Ado. An alternative reading, just mentioned, is that Odo’s return of the confiscated property conforms to an ‘act of mercy’ script, one that we find written into a number of charters of the period from both north and south of the Alps: Odo declares himself to have been ‘incited by the inspiration of almighty God’.​[69]​ If, at the risk of defying my own warning not to read too much into one document, we engage in some plausible speculation, we might suggest that Odo’s mercy was appropriate: that is, that Gildiris tried to take his brother’s land because he was indeed dirt poor, lacking enough property of his own even to pay the court’s compensation.
There is of course a danger of circularity in suggesting this interpretation, because this is only one document, which does not specify the nature of the social relationship between the parties. To see Odo as the powerful/higher class actor, and Gildiris and Troctovus as the poorer/lower class ones, is, after all, to impose on the situation the assumptions of a modern ‘bourgeois subject’ (me). But we can avoid it in practice because our assumptions depend ultimately on the many thousands of pieces of evidence from this society that allow us to calibrate the social level or role of, say, the priest. In that context, we are fortunate that what we have in this case is the charter at the end of the process, which reveals that a pro anima gift had provoked a number of different property transactions: an appropriation, a confiscation, a restitution, a return gift, and the cancellation of a debt (and that is not counting whatever heavenly return gift Audiris might have enjoyed). It is significant, moreover, that the ultimate solution to the dispute was a gift, because despite their limitations the surviving dispute notitiae and other charters reveal that a range of alternative transactions was available: a lease-back, for instance, or a time-limited restitution of usufruct. Taking the charters of Lombard and Carolingian Italy as a whole, documents enshrining the latter – essentially lease arrangements of some kind – increase as donations decrease through the ninth century.​[70]​ The land at the apparent heart of the dispute in this eighth-century case was not especially central to this document – it is nowhere specified, and no place names are given – and since anthropology teaches us that gifts are not just about objects (even if the object is a piece of land), but that property connotes status too, we can see Odo’s act of mercy here as intended to enhance his own status as well as to preserve (albeit at a low level) that of Gildiris and Troctovus.​[71]​ On one reading, the latter’s meagre patrimony constituted what Annette Weiner categorized as an ‘inalienable possession’: a property imbued with the identity of one owner even while another might be enjoying its fruits.​[72]​ We might, indeed, characterize the initial gift, that Audiris made to S. Maria in Sarnaglia, in the same way. These are of course speculations, as the subjunctive indicates.​[73]​ They reveal the possibilities, but also the limits, of anthropological insights into early medieval evidence. But simply being able to raise these suggestions also shows what was at stake in these processes, and underlines that parties had a good deal of power to shape their own social roles through their performances during them, and their production and use of written documents within them.
If the balance of power lay with the disputants, we should see the court as nonetheless important to the process. We can accept the idea of Gildiris’ and Troctovus’s poverty without having to suppose that in insisting on compensation that could not be paid the court tribunal was making itself irrelevant. Rather, it surely reveals both awareness of the Lombard law of the time, which was invoked in the charter in a relatively common formula, and its limits.​[74]​ In ensuring that the dispute took the course that it did, the court and the parties were skirting around Liutprand’s law on defaulting debtors, which stipulated that they be punished by enslavement.​[75]​ Though a debtor to Ado, Gildiris was spared this fate. As for his other transgression – the illegitimate seizure of property – the Lombard law code gives no clear idea of the circumstances in which composition should be required, let alone on its level, so in ruling for an unattainable level here, and leaving it at that, the court was effectively shifting responsibility back to the victorious plaintiff, Odo. It may even have been inviting the act of mercy that followed.
The Sarnaglia case therefore indicates important features of the disputing process in the late Lombard period. First, written law was not absolutely authoritative. It was a point of reference for procedural strategies.​[76]​ There was therefore, secondly, a hazy and constantly permeable boundary between formal and informal disputing processes – and between the written and the oral within them. Chris Wickham has noted how the balance between written and oral shifts slightly in the surviving notitiae from the late eighth and early ninth centuries: in particular, written proofs – always documents – ceased to have to be supported by oaths.​[77]​ As for written documents themselves, the Sarnaglia case shows how little guidance the law codes provided about how to draw them up and how to treat them. It also shows that their scribes nonetheless followed interlocking sets of non-legislative norms: the legal formulae handed down through the bureaucratic traditions in which they were schooled, and customary norms that established acceptable ways in which to script the performance of the dispute. Neither formulae nor norms were absolutely fixed: both were subject to development as the requirements of courts and disputants changed. The Sarnaglia donation charter includes a number of such formulae, though none that would put it in the category of ‘undefended’ cases. The hint of ‘fictitiousness’ in the Sarnaglia case comes rather from the circularity of an apparent confiscation subsequently entirely restored. While it does not therefore sit on a direct line of evolution towards the fully-fledged ‘undefended case’ notitia that emerges a hundred years or so later, it nevertheless points to an important contributing factor in that development: the strategic deployment of written documents to shape a dispute, in this case not just the surviving donation charter but the others that it mentions in the process.

Managing Disputes with Documents: Piacenza
Taking our search for documents about disputes forward into the ninth century, we can sensibly focus on the collections preserved at and from Piacenza. For one thing, it is there that we can trace the most straightforward development from earlier ninth-century charters to the ‘undefended case’ format proper: as we have seen, the first fully-developed ostensio cartae formula is generally held to be a Piacenza charter of 880/1. That said, it should immediately be added that Piacenza cannot be taken as in any sense peculiar in its development of ‘undefended case’ notitiae. Earlier examples of undefended cases – but whose documents do not adopt the ostensio cartae formula – do survive from elsewhere: Piacenza documents may be important among survivals, but they can also be taken as broadly representative of developments occurring far more widely, across the Lombard kingdom and its Carolingian successor.​[78]​ Nonetheless, the profile of Piacenza’s dispute notitiae is significant in itself. There is a complete lacuna in such documents between 911 and 976, a hiatus in archiving that did not affect the type of documents being kept.​[79]​ Those that survive either side of that gap (i.e. 880/1-911 and 976-1077) nearly all follow one or other of the ‘undefended case’ models. Of the thirty-four Piacenza charters classed as dispute notitiae (or placita) by Manaresi and Volpini (ranging in date from 830 to 1077), twenty adopt a fully-fledged ‘undefended’ model (ten take the ostensio cartae form, and five each the finis intentionis and investitura salva querela), two conclude with an amica pactuacio, and a further six can be regarded as early versions of these forms.​[80]​ Of the remaining six, two are instalments of the very long-running squabble over their boundaries between the dioceses of Piacenza and Parma: a different class of dispute altogether, which can also be said to include a record of an inquisition into property contested between two monasteries.​[81]​ Another two involve the exercise of the power of royal bannum,​[82]​ leaving only one that might record a dispute resolved through a court.​[83]​  Furthermore, when we examine just the dispute notitiae surviving after the long lacuna (that is, from 976 through to the final pre-1100 example, from 1077) we find a far greater concentration on the activities of the very highest in society. Of sixteen such notitiae, seven involve the bishop of Piacenza and other parties including another bishop and members of current or recent comital families.​[84]​ Three involve marquises who were prominent landowners in the region, and one a count of the palace.​[85]​ Four embody legal actions by prominent local clerics (a deacon, an archdeacon, an abbess and an abbot) and the final one is the grant of royal bannum to the canons of S. Antonino.​[86]​  We no longer find preserved documents relating to figures a rung or two down the social ladder such as the sculdahis from Niviano, Petrus, whose dossier of documents, extending for forty years from the 870s, found its way into the archives of S. Antonino.​[87]​ To judge from the notitiae, therefore, archivists at Piacenza became increasingly selective about what they preserved. Moreover, the nature of their selection, preserving only those notitiae in which their own institutions’ property rights were negotiated with the most influential in their society, points to the true purpose of the undefended case format: to strengthen property title, rather than to record the management of real disputes in court.
We are fortunate, therefore, that there survive from Piacenza non-judicial charters that tell us something about real disputing there. Some of them show that the developments in archival competence just noted had an effect not only on what documents were preserved by posterity but also on the way documents were used in disputes at the time. Perhaps the most striking of them indicates how mutable ‘real’ dispute documents – as opposed to traditional notitiae – could be, and how they operated both within and outside the court, and combined legal formulae creatively. It was drawn up at Areglia in June 898 by the notarius Gumpertus, who describes it as a ‘breve donacionis adque confirmacionis’ (a brief of donation and confirmation); and though it does indeed involve a transfer, it was not primarily of landed property, but of what is here termed a calumnia.​[88]​ In Roman law, calumnia was a false accusation (parties had to swear in court that their suits were not false).​[89]​ By the late empire it had come also to refer to actions that were merely ill-considered, rather than malicious.​[90]​ Which of these was the case here is not clear from the rather obscure wording of the breve. It seems to record that John of ‘Marrade’, son of Stadevertus, had acquired property as a result of his accusation that Andreas of Avuario, son of Adelbert, had abducted, beaten, and raped his wife Adeltruda, and that he now ‘transferred and entrusted’ (‘tradavit vel perdonavit’) that property to Rapert, abbot of S. Paolo di Mezzano Scotti, and his advocate Dagifredus. He did so presumably because his accusation had been judged, or at least had been claimed, to be false or unfounded (hence, a calumnia).​[91]​ In fact, then, this document was part of the settlement of a criminal case: the transaction of property arose from a situation of conflicting accusations in which the monastery took a quasi-public role in what appears to have been a compromise settlement. This case therefore involved the original charges, the admission of calumnia, or malicious prosecution, and a quitclaim to landed property. In conveying these in a single document, this breve resembles the one written by Rodoaldus with which we started. Both demonstrate a certain competence in the use of documents: the combination of what we would term ‘criminal’ and ‘civil’ formulae was a creative act by the issuer and his scribe.
A document of this sort – and there are not many among survivals, whether from Piacenza or anywhere else – reveals the skill with which some, at least, of the commissioners and writers of charters could use them in these contexts. The willingness to be creative with the use of documents is evident too in other charters produced by real disputes, which, however, also speak of anxiety on the part of others when faced with their opponents’ competence in this respect. Thus, for example, a breve written by the notarius Giselpertus in April 883 relates how a priest, Agustinus of S. Antonino in Piacenza, had forced a certain Grasevertus to draw up a charter relinquishing any claim on lands that the latter’s father had transferred by charter to his sisters, because Agustinus doubted Grasevertus’s claim that his father’s charter had been lost.​[92]​ Possession of charters was also at issue in a notitia of August 892 written by the notarius Gausus, which records that Daniel of Godi came to the church of S. Giovanni in Piacenza to swear an oath on the altar along with six sacramentales, as was required by the Lex Salica under which he lived. He swore that he did not possess the charters that had been claimed by Andelberga, widow of Rotcari of Godi, and her daughter Rotrada.​[93]​ The importance of pledges here is underlined by another document, written by the priest Raginaldus, recording the testimony of nine pledged men (presumably peasant tenants) concerning pig-grazing rights in a wood. This gives some sense of the amount of oath-making that went on, and suggests how much of it was documented: that is, nearly all of it.​[94]​ Formulae about criminal procedures, property rights, pledges, oaths, and the loss and renewal of documents were among the devices that those with skill and experience in the handling of legal writing could call upon in late ninth-century Piacenza to further their interests; and, it is worth repeating, Piacenza was not at all unusual in this respect.
In a situation where the writing of documents was so central to legal business, litigants must clearly have found it important to have access to those who performed such writing best, and the Piacenza documents offer hints at how that access was constrained. By themselves, the examples just cited raise the familiar problem that our picture of contemporary practices is dictated by the circumstances of later preservation. In other words, these charters all ultimately worked to the benefit of the institutions that kept them. The transfer of property following John’s calumnia was written by the notarius Gumpertus and passed to S. Paolo in Mezzano Scotti; Grasevertus’s quitclaim, written by the notarius Giselpertus, allowed property that was initially possessed by women to pass to the church of S. Antonino in Piacenza; similarly, Daniel’s oath, recorded by the notarius Gausus, relinquished a claim to the possessions of a widow and her daughter, which then passed to S. Giovanni in Piacenza; and the priest Raginaldus wrote a document specifying grazing rights in a wood controlled by the cathedral church of Piacenza (probably his own). It is straightforward to think that these charters were preserved, just like traditional court case notitiae, because they supported the property rights of the institutions that kept them. Fortunately, however, we also possess evidence that our record is not simply a product of what we might call ‘beneficiary archiving’. One Piacenza document, undated but probably to be put in the decade or so before 890/891, lists transactions and pledges associated with the figure of Petrus de Niviano, who was a sculdassius in the Piacentino from 880/1 to 891.​[95]​ Since different pledges are entered in different hands, it seems to be a running record of judicial actions made as and when they took place, usefully demonstrating that lay officials kept track of the cases and documentation that passed before them. Since, furthermore, at least one of the hands is identifiable as that of a Piacentine notary known from other documents, this rough-and-ready text shows that laity as well as clergy could possess the institutional clout to command the expertise of those well-practised in document writing. In Piacenza as elsewhere, the men who possessed these skills were clearly professionals. The list of Piacentine charter scribes of the ninth century reveals two significant features.​[96]​ First, most gave themselves no clerical designation (such as presbiter or clericus), but preferred notarius (occasionally with scriptor) – a statement, in other words, of their occupation, which implied nothing about their lay or clerical status either way. Secondly, those who appear on more than a handful of occasions wrote charters preserved in the archives of more than one institution: that is, they were not ‘house’ scribes, but performed their task for a number of different ‘employers’ (it is impossible to say whether they did so for money, though this seems likely, prima facie). Taken as a whole, then, the Piacenza evidence indicates that it was created by a professional cadre of charter scribes. It also shows that increasingly through the ninth century this group worked most readily and most often in the interests of the best-organized and most powerful in their region: churches, monasteries, lay officials, and the most prominent families.​[97]​

Conclusion
The ‘undefended case’ format is therefore an especially stark example of a wider phenomenon: creativity in the use of documents in disputes. As anxiety over their loss shows, legal documents were valued as objects to wield in the course of disputes. But it was not only the fact of their existence that was valuable: it was what they said and how they said it. The primary function of many was to assert if not to strengthen rights to property, and some were simply textual devices to that end. The ‘undefended case’ types can certainly be seen as such: epiphenomena of a documentary culture that had developed its own rationale. But documents of that kind themselves also demonstrate that forms of words – formulae – could be manipulated; and for some that meant that their meanings shifted with context. Though nearly all charters were preserved ultimately because they had something to do with the ownership of property, this was not always their only function at the time they were written. At S. Maria in Sarnaglia, a donation charter was a vehicle for strengthening the social ties of patronage of its priest; similarly, in the case of calumnia from Piacenza John can be seen as putting himself under the patronage of the abbot of S. Paolo di Mezzano Scotti. It is no coincidence, moreover, that these two parties were ecclesiastical institutions. The Piacenza charters demonstrate that by the late ninth century expertise in the use of documents was not accessible to all equally. Churches, monasteries and influential laymen were more likely than the ordinary laity to command the skills of those who could write documents most effectively; and ecclesiastical institutions in particular were better able to store documents for the long term. The latter ability in particular may lie behind the increasing social exclusivity of the ‘undefended case’ types that we saw at Piacenza. It may be, that is, that ecclesiastical archivists were choosing to preserve not just particular types of documents – court-case notitiae, or even just those of ‘undefended case’ type – but only those with particular protagonists – the politically powerful, especially an emerging and relatively narrow group of signorial families. Very useful as they may have been in validating rights, ‘undefended case’ notitiae may have been increasingly open only to those with the notarial and archival resources to generate and keep them.​[98]​
It might seem surprising, then, that over the long term, the ‘undefended case’ type proved a dead end. Ultimately, the history of Italian judicial documents saw the triumph of informal and mediatory procedures and the unformulaic notices that recorded them: a development linked definitively to the growth of communal jurisdiction in north Italian and Tuscan cities.​[99]​ The ‘undefended case’ format would not have a future much beyond 1100. Yet we can perhaps see reasons for this in the alternative tradition of documenting disputes that has been touched on here: the non-judicial documents, brevia and notitiae, which provide our best evidence for real social conflicts. They show that law courts were not central to such conflicts: the disputing process did not begin and end in court. And they also show that success in that process increasingly came to depend on a certain expertise with documents that some were better able to wield than others. As charter scribes became more adept at using formulae that were originally restricted to property transactions for all sorts of other business – for taking on power of attorney in a rape case, or guarding against fraud – so the documents they produced became both expressions and instruments of power within their local societies. The powerful therefore had an increasing incentive to monopolize this expertise.
The archival expertise that developed alongside this notarial competence might be another reason for the atrophy of forms like the ostensio cartae. The notitiae generated by law courts remained valuable for as long as the court bestowed on their documents, and the transactions and rights that they embodied, a quality that litigants could not find elsewhere: that of public validation. This should not be seen as a stamp bearing the authority of a ‘state’; it derived rather from acknowledgement by a peer group in a formal setting, recognized as such. But an institution with a well-managed archive that reliably preserved documentary proofs had less need of the imprimatur of public validity that law courts had given to transactions through the ‘undefended case’ forms. Moreover, once other formal settings became available, and acquired some of the authority that had surrounded the royal courts – once, in the early twelfth century, imperial power had started to decline and communal government to assume greater competence – those seeking to affirm their rights could and did turn to these new sources of validity instead. In other words, the ‘undefended case’ formats shared their fate with that of the royal law court, and the disappearance of the latter was the effect of declining royal power, not its cause.
The link between documentary change and social transformation operated in Italy at a different level from that proposed for a ‘transforming’ tenth- and eleventh-century west Francia. Certainly, there is no strong parallel to draw between the decline of royal power in west Francia, and the change in documentary format with which it coincided, and that of imperial power in Italy a century or more later. Although in twelfth-century Italy the ‘undefended case’ format shared the fate of royal-imperial law courts, it is also disproportionately prominent in the record because of archivists’ priorities and preferences: there are plenty of other types of document that get less attention and do not ‘fit’ the rise and fall of imperial power in the same way. In Italy – and this may also be the case in west Francia – it is not that the production of legal documents responded to social change; it is, rather, that the documents were themselves instruments of that change. We can see this as early as the eighth century, and not so much in ‘undefended case’ types as in those many other types of documents that disputes generated, but that got preserved more haphazardly. The successful deployment of these documents in the course of disputes depended to a large extent on the skill of the scribes who drew them up. This fact in itself encouraged the greater institutionalization of scribes, whether they were the notary-judges who emerged at Pavia, those who came to work for bishops as the latter increasingly assumed civil administrative roles, or those who could draw on their knowledge of burgeoning institutional archives – of monasteries and of signorial families. By helping their institutions to secure their property rights, extend their landed wealth, and impose their power over others, the documents that those scribes produced were themselves instruments of social transformation. By giving written permanence to dues that had hitherto been only temporary, Rodoaldus’s documentary manoeuvre, with which we began, meant that the bishop of Piacenza could thereafter count on regular labour services from Hermefrit’s descendants, and their heirs. In the ninth century, the professional skill of notaries and the power of institutions were mutually reinforcing, to the benefit of both, and to the detriment of those who had once looked to law courts to uphold their meagre rights.
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